Remarks With Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu After Their Meeting in Tel Aviv, Israel

04/29/2018
Tel Aviv, Israel

PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU: Good afternoon. Secretary Pompeo, Mike, it’s wonderful to welcome you. This is your first visit to Israel as Secretary of State. I think it’s significant that you chose, as did the President, to include Israel on this important itinerary. I think it’s symbolic of our friendship, which is deep, and getting even deeper and stronger. We’ve known each other for some time, I followed your activities in Congress and then as CIA, now as Secretary of State. You’re a true friend of Israel, a true friend of the Jewish people, and I look forward to working with you in your new role. We’ve just had very productive, very focused conversations on our common interests and how to defend our common value.

I want to thank again President Trump for his historic decision on recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. We look forward to welcoming the American delegation to celebrate the relocation of the embassy with you, Ambassador Friedman. I must tell you that the bold decision by President Trump has prompted other countries – there are quite a few now who are planning to move their embassy to Jerusalem as well. It says something about American leadership and about the forthright way in which simple truths are being put forward and the effect this has on the international scene.

Mr. Secretary, I think the greatest threat to the world and to our two countries and to all countries is the marriage of militant Islam with nuclear weapons, and specifically, the attempt of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. We’ve had a very productive talk today on this subject as well. I appreciate the President’s leadership and your position on stopping Iran from ever acquiring nuclear weapons. I appreciate the President’s and your position on stopping Iran’s aggression in the region. That aggression has grown many-fold since the signing of the Iranian deal. If people thought that Iran’s aggression would be moderated as a result of signing the deal, the opposite has happened, and Iran is trying to gobble up one country after the other. Iran must be stopped. Its quest for nuclear bombs must be stopped. Its aggression must be stopped. And we’re committed to stopping it together.

I was very much encouraged, once again, by the steadfast support of the United States for Israel and for this common effort, which encompasses many other countries, as you know – as you well know, Mr. Secretary. But our bond is special. It’s based on shared values of democracy, freedom, the quest for security and peace, and I can say that today America and Israel are closer than ever before. And I have no doubt that our alliance will grow even closer in the years ahead.

So I want to welcome you back to Israel, Mr. Secretary. It’s a pleasure to see you and I wish you the best of luck in your important mission. Thank you.

SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you.

Well, good afternoon. It is a great honor to be here on my first trip as Secretary of State. I’ve been the Secretary for a handful of hours. As I was saying earlier, I haven’t been to my office yet.

As you said, this relationship’s never been stronger, and I think we should both be proud of that. We had fantastic conversations today on difficult issues facing each of us. We are incredibly proud to be opening the new embassy on May 14th, well ahead of the original timetable. This step comes as Israel celebrates its 70th anniversary of independence and 70 years of recognition as steadfast support for Israel from the American people as well. By recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the seat of its government, we’re recognizing reality. I also stress, as President Trump has said in December, the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem remain subject to negotiations between the parties, and we remain committed to achieving a lasting and comprehensive peace that offers a brighter future for both Israel and the Palestinians.

Many of our conversations today, Mr. Prime Minister, as you said, centered on Iran. Strong cooperation with close allies like you is critical to our efforts to counter Iran’s destabilizing and malign activity throughout the Middle East and indeed throughout the world. We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s dangerous escalation of threats to Israel and the region, and Iran’s ambition to dominate the Middle East remains. The United States is with Israel in this fight and we strongly support Israel’s sovereign right to defend itself.

Regarding the JCPOA, President Trump’s been pretty clear. This deal is very flawed. He’s directed the administration to try and fix it, and if we can’t fix it, he’s going to withdraw from the deal. It’s pretty straightforward. Unlike the past administration, President Trump has a comprehensive Iran strategy that is designed to counter the full array of threats emanating from Tehran.

As part of the President’s comprehensive Iran strategy, we are also working to counter the broad set of non-nuclear threats: Iran’s missile systems, its support for Hizballah, the importation of thousands of proxy fighters into Syria, and its assistance to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. We look forward to working closely with strong allies like Israel in countering these threats and rolling back the full range of Iranian malign influence.

Regarding Syria, where the barbaric Assad regime is propped up by Iran, the United States’ top priorities are to defeat ISIS, de-escalate violence, deter the use of chemical weapons, and ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and support an ultimate political resolution to the conflict. Our strategy to do that remains unchanged. We strongly support the UN-led efforts in Geneva to bring an end to the Syrian conflict, which has gone on for far too long.

We know there are many challenges ahead and we look forward to being your partner in resolving each of them. The United States and Israel I know together can achieve that. It’s great to be back.

PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU: Thank you.

Will the US missile strike be the turning point in Syria’s shifting war?

Harout Akdedian,
Central European University
April 7, 2017

The US has struck the Syrian airbase used to launch a suspected sarin gas attack against Khan Sheikhun that killed more than 80 civilians. US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson cited the chemical attack as the reason for their country’s first direct involvement in Syria’s six-year war.

A Pentagon spokesman said Russia was informed ahead of the attack on the al-Shayrat airbase. According to the Associated Press, opposition group the Syrian Coalition, has welcomed the intervention. The rebel commander whose district was hit by the suspected chemical weapon attack has said he hopes the strike will be a “turning point” in the war.

But the long-running conflict has had many such apparently pivotal moments.

The fall of Aleppo

By the end of 2016, for instance, opposition forces in the Syrian city of Aleppo had been overwhelmingly defeated, raising doubts about their ability to endure the fight against the Assad regime. Especially as the latter receives active support from the Russian government and Shi’a militias.

The battle of Aleppo, much like the Battle of Stalingrad in the second world war, was characterised by close-quarters combat, massive displacement, great destruction and recurring air raids on civilian populations and infrastructure.

A damaged mosque after an airstrike on the rebel-held village of al-Jina, Aleppo province. Ammar Abdullah/Reuters

Scholars and researchers were largely divided after the Aleppo assault. Some viewed the outcome as the beginning of the end for the losing party – the Stalingrad moment of the Syrian war. Others recognised the importance of the events without considering them decisive.

And, like the US missile strike, the suspected chemical attack on April 5 was perceived as another watershed moment. But, on the ground, the question is how these critical moments will shape the immediate options of warring factions.

Recent military developments in Hama and Damascus might indicate the direction the war is taking, with the rebels trying to recover from the battle of Aleppo and launching new offensives.

Aftermath the fall

After their defeat in Aleppo, many opposition groups reconsidered their inter-factional alliances. In the Idlib governorate and the countryside around Aleppo, for instance, a number of factions merged with what used to be known as the Nusra Front, or Jabhat Fath el-Sham, to form the new Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.

Simultaneously, Ahrar al-Sham, one of the most powerful opposition groups in Syria, was absorbing other factions in the northwest.

Tensions heightened between these two prominent opposition groups as a number of Ahrar al-Sham combatants defected to the recently formed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. The outcome so far has been a delicate balance of power between these two large groups, which represent the most powerful opposition forces in Idlib and its vicinity.

Together they govern the last opposition stronghold, and Assad’s ultimate victory in Syria depends on the divisions and tensions between them. If these groups are not able to unite when and if pro-Assad forces rally again, Idlib, which is the only area under comprehensive rebel control, might go the way of Aleppo. Its fall would leave the opposition controlling only small isolated patches of territory.

Idlib and beyond

Given that Ahrar al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham have maintained their cooperation thus far, Idlib promises to be a much bigger challenge for the Assad regime than landlocked Aleppo. A siege on Idlib is practically impossible as long as its border with Turkey stays under opposition control.

The weakest point for the opposition in Idlib is the main passage between the governorate and Turkey, the Bab al-Hawa Crossing. If pro-government forces were to capture this strategic spot in an all-out siege of Idlib, it could enable another battle of attrition.

To disrupt the regime’s momentum and prevent it from regrouping its forces, this time around Idlib, both Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham have launched an offensive on the Hama front. Since March 21 2017, opposition forces have taken dozens of government-held villages, coming within a few kilometres of the city of Hama.

Though the southward expansion from Idlib has thus far not reached isolated territories in Homs, a city bombarded by the government in 2012, the territorial gains provide a number of advantages. The Hama offensive creates a buffer zone for Idlib, and mobilises and positions opposition forces in threatening strategic locations. This compels pro-regime forces to either engage on insufficiently fortified fronts or withdraw to other defensive positions.

Reuters/Institute for the Study of War

In light of these conditions, opposition forces near southern Aleppo may also attempt an offensive on the town of Khanasir, cutting off the government’s supply route to its forces in Aleppo and forcing pro-regime troops to disperse in different directions.

From that perspective, the suspected chemical attack could be seen as an attempt by Assad to distract the opposition from its advance southwards.

The Hama offensive

The Hama offensive opens new possibilities for the opposition. But to succeed on this front government forces must be kept occupied elsewhere. So, while opposition forces were mobilising in Hama, other rebel factions such as Faylaq al-Sham reopened the Damascus front in the areas of Qabun and Jobar, less than six kilometres from the heart of Syria’s capital.

Opposition forces have not made any significant gains yet. But the proximity of these new clashes to Damascus is sufficient to keep the regime’s forces in the area occupied and committed.

Another condition favouring opposition forces is the current vacuum in Syria’s sparsely populated Badiya desert region, resulting from the ongoing battle for Raqqa.

As the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces gathered north in the past few weeks, Islamic State forfeited southern areas to reinforce its positions in Raqqa and Tabqa. Meanwhile, Ahrar al-Sham and Western-backed Free Syrian Army forces expanded in eastern Qalamoun and reinforced their presence on the Jordanian and Iraqi borders in the southwest.

Free Syrian Army fighters launch a Grad rocket from Halfaya town, in Hama province. Ammar Abdullah/Reuters

Islamic State has antagonised all armed factions in Syria, but the geographic proximity of the Syrian Democratic Forces to Raqqa makes them the likely inheritors of its abandoned territories in the north.

If the Syrian Democratic Forces were to expand towards Raqqa, it might lead Islamic State to redirect its forces southward to find safe havens in the Syrian desert. This would create an undesired distraction for opposition forces that recently captured territories in the southeast.

While battles are raging in Damascus in the areas around the districts of Jobar and Qaboun, different factions in the north and south are rallying against Islamic State to capitalise on its defeats.

What next?

These developments show that, following the battle of Aleppo, whatever advantage the Assad regime enjoyed heading into the latest round of Geneva talks in February may not last. And the proactive foreign support that pushed the Assad regime forwards on the ground could dissipate in light of recent events.

A civil defence member breathes through an oxygen mask after a suspected gas attack in the town of Khan Sheikhoun. Ammar Abdullah/Reuters

The key to Assad’s future may well lie with the Russian reaction to the US move. As the country woke to the news of the overnight attack, the head of the defence and security committee of the Russian upper house of parliament said his country would call for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council.

Meanwhile, on the ground, government forces and opposition groups continue to mobilise, and territorial control keeps shifting. The irregular methods of warfare employed by armed rebels reinforce their resilience, flexibility and longevity in a war now entering its sixth bloody year.

Opposition groups may also find further air support from Turkey to expand their presence in Islamic State territories. While opposition groups will not be able to oust the regime, the regime will not be able to eliminate the opposition either.

A shift of US foreign policy on Syria could have been the game-changer. But the US airstrike is more likely to reinforce the balance of power between the combating factions rather than lead to a turning point.

Harout Akdedian, Postdoctoral research fellow, Central European University

This article was originally published on The Conversation.